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ABSTRACT 
 
In the face of the dramatic economic events of recent months and the inability of academics and 
policymakers to prevent them, the New Consensus Macroeconomics (NCM) model has been the 
subject of several criticisms. This paper considers one of the main criticisms lodged against the 
NCM model, namely, the absence of any essential role for the government and fiscal policy. 
Given the size of the public sector and the increasing role of fiscal policy in modern economies, 
this simplifying assumption of the NCM model is difficult to defend. This paper maintains that 
conventional arguments used to support this controversial assumption—including historical 
reasons, theoretical propositions, and practical issues—do not have solid foundations. There is, 
in fact, nothing inherently monetary in the stabilization policies found in the model. Thus, fiscal 
policy could play a role at least as important as monetary policy in the NCM model. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The last few months have seen a dramatic succession of events: the subprime crisis in the U.S. 
housing market triggered a national credit crunch and then a deep financial crisis around the 
world. If there was any doubt, this proved that the entire world economy is suffering badly, with 
discussions of a very long and serious recession. Many colleagues that took part in the Hans 
Bockler Stiftung conference in Berlin (October 2008) claimed that this is also the time of 
profound rethinking in academia and policymaking. Would the New Consensus 
Macroeconomics (NCM) wither away under the continuous challenges posed by the financial 
crisis and the worldwide economic recession? Or would the NCM amend itself so as to contain 
these challenges?  
The paper does not attempt to answer these questions. Its purpose is much more modest. 
It aims to provide an overview of the recent evolution of formal models in macroeconomics 
before considering the NCM model and one of its main weaknesses, namely the absence of an 
explicit role for the government and fiscal policy in its core three-equation system. This 
provides only the beginning of an answer to those difficult questions, but it is possibly the 
necessary beginning in order to assess the significance of those questions.  
 
2. THE HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF THE NEW CONSENSUS MACROECONOMICS 
MODEL 
 
Academics and policymakers have been using models of the macro economy for a long time. 
The early formal models appeared in the early 1960s. They had two main features. First, they 
were the joint results of work in academia and central banks. At the time, the macroeconomic 
debate was dominated by the so-called neoclassical synthesis, and it was only natural that 
academics and practitioners build on their shared theoretical framework in order to produce 
formal models of the macro economy. Secondly, academics and policymakers worked together 
on the construction of models that would provide a comprehensive and in-depth representation 
of the structure of the economy. Early formal models were thus large structural models, built on 
a sector-by-sector, equation-by-equation basis, often using national income statistical categories. 
These two main features of early formal models of the macro economy were well 
represented in the first structural model used at the Federal Reserve Board (FRB) in the United   4
States, namely the so-called MPS model. The MPS was a joint project from staff members at the 
FRB led by Frank de Leeuw, as well as academic economists led by Franco Modigliani at MIT 
and Albert Ando at the University of Pennsylvania. The name MPS itself is in fact an indication 
of this joint work between academics and practitioners; MPS is the acronym of MIT, University 
of Pennsylvania, and the Social Science Research Council, which supported the project. Also, 
the MPS model, which remained the primary formal model for the staff of the FRB from the late 
1960s until the beginning of 1996, was a large structural model. Its early version had about 125 
stochastic behavioral equations and more than 200 identities. 
For decades, large structural models like the MPS remained popular with academics and 
practitioners, but slowly fell out of fashion in academia. There were two major causes for this 
outcome. First, academics complained that large structural models contained too many 
equations and identities, making them cumbersome. In practice, this meant that their policy 
implications were often difficult to grasp. Furthermore, when successful attempts were made, 
the policy implications were not entirely plausible. Secondly, academics complained that large 
structural models, by their nature, were not equipped to encompass new theoretical and 
empirical advances. Putting it in a different way, the academia progress recorded during the 
1970s and 1980s could not easily be accommodated in formal models of hundreds of equations. 
Of course, this does not mean that theoretical or technical amendments to the general structure 
of large structural models were never made. Many theoretical or technical amendments were 
made and, in fact, for some time the changes introduced seemed to work. For instance, for 
several decades the old MPS model at the FRB survived theoretical and empirical criticisms.  
By early 1990s the approach of incremental amendments was nevertheless called into 
question. Two major issues were raised. First, Sims (1980 and 2002) and other economists 
complained that the econometric techniques used in old structural models were obsolete. 
Secondly, and more importantly, the Lucas critique highlighted the limited role of expectations 
and intertemporal decision-making in the traditional modeling of the monetary policy process 
(Lucas 1976). In this regard, it is worth noting that large structural models did not ignore the 
role of expectations, but large structural models only included the case of adaptive expectations, 
which were implicitly formalized in the lag structure of the explanatory variables. This meant 
that key questions like the long-run effects of fiscal consolidation or the output losses of a 
disinflationary monetary policy strategy could not be easily assessed.    5
Therefore, starting in the early 1990s, the econometric criticisms, together with the 
Lucas critique, led to a major overhaul of large structural models, including the case of the MPS 
at the FRB (Fontana 2009d). As a result, large structural models were replaced with small 
formal models that closely reflected the most recent theoretical and econometrics advances in 
academia. Furthermore, small formal models explicitly modeled the role of expectations in 
policymaking. In particular, rational expectations took the place of adaptive expectations in 
formal models of the macro economy. In fact, according to some influential commentators, the 
explicit introduction of the rational expectation hypothesis in macroeconomic models 
constitutes the crucial change from the old to the modern macroeconomic models: “From a 
policy evaluation perspective, a fundamental difference between the old models and the new 
models is the rational expectations assumption. In my view this change in assumption is 
significant enough to be called a paradigm shift” (Taylor 1997).  
The current NCM model is the latest and possibly the most successful version of these 
small formal macroeconomic models that have largely replaced large structural models in 
academia, as well as in policymaking. Interestingly, the NCM model shares an important feature 
of early formal models of the macro economy. Like the early 1960s models, the NCM model is 
the outcome of a joint effort of academics and policymakers. In other words, it is a model 
explicitly built on a shared theoretical framework. In fact, another name for the NCM model is 
the new neoclassical synthesis model. Putting it slightly different, the NCM model represents 
the result of a successful convergence in academia and policymaking toward a shared theoretical 
framework that draws on previous theoretical and empirical advances; in this case, the 
contributions of the real business cycle approach and the New Keynesian approach to 
macroeconomics.  
The current NCM model is a typical product of the Lucas critique. One of the most 
important outcomes of the Lucas critique was to highlight the ad hoc structure of early formal 
models. This led to the view that modern formal models of the economy had to be “rigorous,” 
meaning that the behavior of the agents in formal models had to have micro-foundations, be 
optimal, and based on rational expectations. These features have played a key role in the 
replacement of large models with small models. In fact, the NCM model has rigorous micro-
foundations. Furthermore, in its standard version it only uses three equations, which, in turn< 
has facilitated the construction of highly mathematical and complex versions of it.    6
Whereas the NCM model encompasses some of the most attractive features of the 
modern, small formal models of the macro economy, it also shows some of their weaknesses. 
Small formal models have rigorous micro-foundations and are often based on rational 
expectations. However, these seemingly attractive features require the use of simplistic and 
often controversial assumptions, which strongly limit the explanatory powers of small models. 
For instance, one of the most controversial assumptions of the NCM model is the absence of any 
essential role for the public sector and fiscal policy. As argued by Goodhart “this is 
symptomatic of a deeper reluctance among macro-economists to conceive of any essential role 
for government. They seem intellectually happier to imagine an economy which is only 
inhabited by private sector agents and an ‘independent’ Central Bank with its own loss function 
(and no mandate from, or acceptability to, a democratically elected government)” (Goodhart 
2005). Given the size of the public sector and the increasing role of fiscal policy in modern 
economies, this assumption is difficult to defend. This is even more the case today. How could 
the NCM model be used to assess, let alone propose, solutions to the 2007–2009 financial crisis 
and related recession when the public sector is not even part of the core model? 
In conclusion, the historical evolution of formal models from early 1960s to now is not 
to be considered, as it is often done in the NCM literature, as a continuous progress from 
imperfect to perfect models. There are limitations to the use of the NCM model (and, more 
generally, modern small formal models) in the same way that there were limitations to the use of 
early 1960s models of the economy. It is only the locus of these limitations that has changed. 
From this perspective, as argued by Goodhart, “in many respects the Lucasian revolution has 
transferred the focus of implausibility, often down-right nonsense, from the implications of the 
solutions of the models to their initial structural assumptions” (Goodhart 2005). The next 
sections present the three-equation NCM model and discuss some of its more controversial 
features, before showing that these controversial features have origin in some simplistic 
assumptions, including (among others) the absence of a clear role for the government and fiscal 
policy. 
 
3. THE THREE-EQUATION NEW CONSENSUS MACROECONOMICS MODEL 
 
The NCM is based on a three-equation model, namely an IS-type curve, a Phillips curve, and a 
monetary policy equation. The model has several standard features of the modern New   7
Keynesian approach to macroeconomics. All three equations can be derived from explicit 
optimizing behavior of individual agents in the presence of market failures, including imperfect 
competition, incomplete markets, and asymmetric information. These market failures generate 
transitory price and wage stickiness, which, in turn, give support to the view that in the short-
run, the aggregate supply responds to changes in the aggregate demand. Aggregate demand has 
thus a transitory, yet nontrivial, role in determining the equilibrium level of output and 
employment in the economy. In other words, where individual agents behave rationally, the 
outcome of their actions has adverse macroeconomic effects. On this basis, activist government 
actions are then justified to eliminate or limit some of these effects.  
In terms of the mechanics of the model, price and wage stickiness play a key role in 
relating the monetary policy rule to the IS-type curve. The central bank, via changes in the 
short-run nominal interest rate, is actually able to control the short-run real interest rate. In this 
way, the central bank is able to affect the consumption and investment components of aggregate 
demand and, hence, the current level of output. This is an important theoretical result because it 
goes well with another important tenet of the NCM model, namely that low and stable inflation 
is conducive to growth, stability, and the efficient functioning of the market. When the economy 
is hit by shocks that take it away from its natural path, it is the central bank that is responsible 
for achieving the desired rate of inflation in the long run; subject to that, they are also 
responsible for bringing output and employment to their equilibrium levels in the short-run 
(Allsopp and Vines 2005). However, in pursuit of its objectives, the central bank faces a short-
run trade-off between inflation and output. This trade-off is captured by the Phillips curve, 
which can be of thought as the aggregate supply component of the NCM model.  
Drawing on Meyer (2001), Carlin and Soskice (2006), and Goodhart (2005), a simplified 
version of the NCM model can thus be represented by a set of three equations describing the 
dynamics of changes in the output gap (equation 1), in the inflation rate (equation 2), and the 





                                                 
1 See also Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (1999), Walsh (2002),and especially Arestis (2007) for an open economy 
extension of the NCM model.   8
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where  0 3 < a  and a0 is a constant that indicates, among others things, the effects of fiscal 
variables on the output gap () y y − ;  1 2 1 = +b b , and  0 3 > b ;  1 1 > c , and  0 2 > c ; Et is the 
expectations operator; it is the nominal interest rate controlled by the central bank; π is the rate 
of inflation; π
T is the target for the inflation rate; r* is the equilibrium real interest, namely the 
interest rate that prevails in the long-run when current output y is at potential level  y ; finally, s1 
and s2 represent stochastic shocks. 
Equation 1 describes an IS-type curve with the current output gap determined by past 
and expected future output gaps, as well the real interest rate. It is an IS-type of curve since, like 
the traditional IS curve of the 1960s neoclassical synthesis, it relates the real interest rate to the 
level of output and employment. However, it differs from the traditional IS curve for a variety 
of reasons. First, it is derived from intertemporal optimization of a utility function, which 
reflects optimal consumption smoothing. In other words, it is an IS curve that has rigorous 
micro-foundations. Secondly, and related to the previous point, the NCM-IS curve contains 
lagged and forward looking elements. The NCM-IS curve is thus a forward looking the IS 
curve. Thirdly, the NCM-IS curve relates the real interest rate to the output gap, namely the 
difference between current y and potential  y  levels of output. 
Equation (2) is a Phillips curve with inflation determined by the current output gap, as 
well as past and expected future inflation rates. The latter term is of great interest. It is an 
indirect measure of the degree of commitment and credibility of the central bank to the long-run 
goal of price stability. Also, consistent with equation (1) and different from the traditional curve 
Phillips curve of the 1960s neoclassical synthesis, the current rate of inflation is determined by 
the current output gap rather than the level of output. 
Finally, Equation (3) is a simple monetary policy rule, namely a standard Taylor rule, 
with the nominal interest rate explained by the current output gap, the deviation of current 
inflation from its target, and the equilibrium real interest rate. Some versions of the NCM model   9
present more complex monetary policy rules, adding to a standard Taylor rule variables such as 
a lagged interest rate, which indicates an interest rate “smoothing” policy strategy of the central 
bank (see, for instance, Arestis 2007). Equation (3) represents a major innovation of modern 
formal models of the economy. It replaces the old LM curve of the of the 1960s neoclassical 
synthesis, which assumed a monetary aggregate rather short-run interest rate as the main control 
variable of the central bank. This means that in the NCM model the quantity of money is a 
residual of the money supply process (Fontana 2009a). Furthermore, Equation (3) shows that 
monetary policy as a systematic response to the inflation and output performance of the 
economy.  
This set of equations (1–3) summarizes the core propositions of the “New Consensus” 
macroeconomics and its policy implication, namely that the central bank has a key role in 
achieving and maintaining price stability in the long-run, while at the same time providing as 
much output stabilization as possible in the short-run. These short- and long-run goals are 
achieved through an aggregate demand channel and an inflation expectations channel of the 
transmission mechanism of monetary policy. Figure 1 below present the aggregate demand 
channel. 
 
Figure 1. The Aggregate Demand (AD) Channel of the Transmission Mechanism of 
Monetary Policy in the NCM Model 
 
( ) π Δ ⇒ − Δ ⇒ Δ Δ ⇒ Δ ⇒ Δ Δ ⇒ Δ ⇒ Δ y y UN Y AD I C r i & &  
 
The aggregate demand channel of the transmission mechanism of monetary policy in the 
NCM model strongly relies on the short-run price and wage rigidities, which allow the central 
bank to influence the short-run real interest rate, namely ( ) ( ) 1 + − t t t E i π , by simply changing the 
short-run nominal interest rate it. This mean that, ceteris paribus, the central bank can alter real 
interest rate-sensitive components of the IS-type curve in equation (1), like consumption C and 
investment I and, hence, the aggregate demand function AD, which, in turn, affect the level of 
current output y in the output gap ( ) y y − . In addition, equation (2) shows that the current 
inflation rate is function of the output gap( ) y y − . Therefore, by appropriate changes in the level   10
of current output and, hence, of the output gap, the central bank is able to bring (and then 
maintain) the current inflation rate to its desired target level 
T π . 
 
Figure 2. The Inflation Expectations Channel of the Transmission Mechanism of 
Monetary Policy in the NCM Model 
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Figure 2 above presents the inflation expectations channel of the transmission 
mechanism of monetary policy in the NCM model. Once established, the inflation expectations 
channel is less laborious, though not less important, than the aggregate demand channel. 
Equation (2) shows that the current inflation rate is a function of the expected value of the future 
rate of inflation  () 1 + t t E π . This means that as long as the central bank is seen to be committed 
through its interest rate policy strategy to achieving and maintaining price stability in the long-
run, namely 
T π π = , then  () 1 + t t E π  is anchored to the actual level of inflation π. In other words, 
in this case, the expected value of the future rate of inflation becomes less important in 
determining the current rate of inflation. There are two main policy implications of this 
situation. First, the two main channels of the monetary transmission mechanism in a closed 
economy are strongly related to each other; the stronger the inflation expectations channel, the 
lower the output cost of achieving and maintaining the goal of (long-run) price stability by 
interest rate changes. In other words, the aggregate demand channel is strengthened by the 
working of the inflation expectations channel. Secondly, the central bank can be more activist in 
pursuing the short-run output stabilization objective; the stronger the inflation expectations 
channel, the lower the inflation cost of deviating in the short-run from the goal of achieving and 
maintaining price stability in the long-run. This important feature of the inflation expectations 
channel of the transmission mechanism of monetary policy in the NCM model is confirmed by 
Adam Posen, a leading monetary economist and one of the main contributors to the NCM 
model. “The ability to have an active policy is exactly what we are hoping for as a result of the 
Fed’s greater transparency regarding its inflation goal and forecasts. […] If you can keep 
inflation expectations anchored, you can be more activist in the short-term” (Posen 2008).   11
In conclusion, the NCM model is based on a three-equation model of the macro 
economy, namely an IS-type curve, a Phillips curve, and a monetary policy equation, which 
highlight the role of the central bank in achieving and maintaining the long-run goal of price 
stability, while at the same time providing as much output stabilization as possible in the short 
run. Long-run price stability and short-run output stabilization are achieved through an 
aggregate demand channel and an inflation expectations channel of the transmission mechanism 
of monetary policy. Furthermore, the NCM model incorporates the most advanced and powerful 
features of the small formal models described in the previous section. It is a rigorous model in 
the sense of the Lucas critique: the behavior of its two agents, namely the central bank and the 
private sector, has accurate micro-foundations, is optimal and is based on rational expectations. 
The next section will consider some of its most controversial features, including the absence of 
a public sector and an explicit role for fiscal policy. 
 
4. INSIDERS’AND OUTSIDERS’ CRITICISMS OF THE NCM MODEL 
 
Over the past decade, the NCM model has been the object of several criticisms. Some of these 
criticisms originate from economists that have contributed to its creation and development. They 
are thus insiders’ assessments of the weaknesses of the NCM model. For instance, this is the 
case of Adam Possen in his disapproval of the dominant use of the rational expectations 
hypothesis in the NCM model:  
 
“In the 1980s and into the 1990s, the forward-looking rational-
expectations models applied to monetary policy by conservative 
economists, like Robert Barro, Alan Meltzer, and Alex 
Cukierman, showed that whenever any central bank looked the 
least bit dovish by having too much concern for real output 
versus inflation goals, inflationary expectations would shoot up 
with no growth benefit. … That characterization turned out to be 
not just an exaggeration through simplification, it was 
completely misleading. … So you can have a very activist 
monetary policy with respect to stabilizing the real economy— 
which, frankly, the Bernanke Fed seems to have adopted— 
without worrying that inflation is going to explode by so doing.” 
(Posen 2008: 20) 
 
   12
Similarly, Blanchard (2008) has argued that the NCM model suffers from the lack of a 
proper analysis of the credit and financial markets (the transversality condition excludes de facto 
the failure of banks and financial institutions), the labor market (workers are always on the labor 
supply curve), and the goods markets (the desired mark-up of price over marginal—rather than 
fixed—costs is assumed to be constant). For obvious reasons of space, this paper will not 
discuss these criticisms, but it is important to point out some key features of these assessments 
of the NCM model. Borrowing Goodhart’s (2008) characterization, the NCM model is now seen 
as a “fair weather” model, which may have some application in a low and stable inflation 
environment, but is increasingly seen even by his stronger supporters much less relevant in the 
current economic climate of highly unstable inflation, deep financial crisis and serious economic 
recession (see, for example, Buiter 2008). Most of the economists critical of the NCM model are 
now working on various ways to amend it, possibly adding more realism to its core equations.  
Other criticisms of the NCM model originate from economists that have been skeptical 
of theoretical and empirical advances in recent decades. These economists show appreciation for 
some features of the NCM model; for example, the rejection of the monetarist hypothesis that 
central banks control monetary aggregates. Yet, they are critical of some of the core 
assumptions of the NCM model, which are considered unrealistic, if not patently false. These 
criticisms are thus outsiders’ assessments of the weaknesses of the NCM. They are also very 
heterogeneous, going from outright rejection of the model to proposal for its amendments (see, 
for instance, contributions in Symposium 2002, 2006a, 2006b, 2007a, and 2007b). Looking at 
the more constructive criticisms, they can be organized around two broad themes, namely the 
amended roles of: (a) monetary policy and (b) fiscal policy in the NCM model. The first set of 
criticisms is related to some controversial features of conventional monetary policy in the NCM 
model and suggests different ways to contain, if not eliminate, those features. Since the focus of 
this paper is on the role of fiscal policy in the NCM model, this first set of criticisms will only 
be briefly discussed.  
The criticisms of conventional monetary policy can be collected under three headings, 
namely “unemployment bias,” “distributional effects,” and “financial instability effects.” First, 
one of the most controversial features of the conventional policy in the NCM model is the so-
called “unemployment bias,” namely the persistent tendency of conventional monetary policy to 
keep the unemployment rate above the natural rate of unemployment, as long as the economy is 
not at price stability. Dalziel (2002), Fontana and Palacio-Vera (2007), and Fontana (2009c),   13
among others, have proposed an “opportunistic” use of the interest rate policy strategy to 
alleviate the effects of this bias; under some circumstances, the central bank should give extra 
weight to output and employment compared to inflation in its monetary policy function. Second, 
another controversial feature of the conventional policy in the NCM model is related to the 
distributional effects of interest rate changes. Interest rate payments are a cost for firms 
borrowing money from banks and, hence, they may fuel an inflationary or deflationary process 
if policy changes in interest rates are passed on from firms to consumers. Furthermore, interest 
rate payments are an income for renters, mostly financial agents who do not play any productive 
role in the economy and earn income from their ownership of financial assets. Lavoie and 
Seccareccia (1999), Smithin (2006), Rochon and Setterfield (2007), and others have discussed 
different interest rate policy rules that take into account these distributive effects. Finally, 
according to the NCM model, monetary policy must respond to changes in the output gap and 
the difference between current and targeted inflation rate. However, since the bubble of the 
1990s, it has been commonplace to discuss if the central bank should also consider asset prices 
when setting the short-run interest rate. Drawing on the work of Minsky (1982), Wray (2008) 
and Tymoigne (2009), among others, it has been argued that financial matters, rather than 
simply asset prices, should indeed be a major (and possibly the exclusive) concern for the 
central bank. From the perspective of these authors, continuous manipulations of the short-run 
interest rate generate financial instability and speculation. For this reason, they suggest that the 
central bank should set the short-run interest rate permanently at zero. 
The second set of criticisms is related to the role of fiscal policy in the NCM model. The 
previous section discussed the key role played by the central bank in the NCM model: the 
central bank is in charge of achieving the desired inflation target and, subject to that, to deliver 
as much output stabilization as possible in the short-run. By contrast, fiscal authorities are either 
ignored or asked to concentrate on the control and sustainability of public finances. In other 
words, the NCM model downplays the role of fiscal policy at the advantage of monetary policy. 
Several arguments have been put forward to justify this policy choice. 
First, supporters of the NCM model have pointed out at the historical evidence of 
previous decades. The historical explanation for the current disaffection with discretionary fiscal 
stabilization policy at the advantage of monetary policy usually maintains that the neoclassical 
synthesis of Keynesianism failed to provide any understanding of the events of the 1970s, let 
alone to solve them. For this reason, the neoclassical synthesis of Keynesianism was replaced by   14
a new theoretical framework, namely the New Classical Macroeconomics (Lucas and Sargent 
1978), which rejected the use of discretionary fiscal stabilization policies. Recent works by 
Seidman (2003), Blinder (2006), and Forder (2007a, 2007b) have called into question this 
explanation. Whatever the merit of the contributions by New Classical Macroeconomists, the 
works of Seidman, Blinder, and Forder suggest an alternative story, where ideology, policy 
mistakes, and particular historical circumstances played a role at least as important as economic 
theory in the rejection of neoclassical synthesis Keynesianism and the consequent downgrading 
of fiscal policy (Fontana 2009b).  
Secondly, supporters of the NCM model have justified the prominent role of monetary 
policy at the expenses of fiscal policy in terms of the so-called “Ricardian equivalence” theory, 
namely the idea that it does not matter whether a government finances spending with debt or tax 
increase, the total level of demand in the economy is the same. Putting it boldly, if consumers 
are “Ricardian” they will save more now to compensate for current higher taxes (in the case of 
tax-financed government expenditure) or future higher taxes (in the case of bond-financed 
government expenditure), as the government has to pay back its debts. The increased 
government spending is therefore exactly offset by decreased consumption on the part of private 
agents, with the result that aggregate demand does not change. As in the previous case, this 
argument against the use of discretionary fiscal policy has also been called into question. 
Blinder (2006) and Arestis and Sawyer (2003 and 2006), among others, have argued that the 
“Ricardian equivalence” view is based on unrealistic theoretical assumptions, including long 
time horizons, perfect foresight, perfect capital markets, and the absence of liquidity constraints. 
Furthermore, Hemming, Kell, and Mahfouz (2002) have also shown that the “Ricardian 
equivalence” view is poorly supported by empirical evidence.  
Finally, supporters of the NCM model have justified the prominent role of monetary 
policy at the expenses of fiscal policy in terms of practical or political arguments, namely that 
fiscal policy has potentially long inside lags compared to monetary policy. Inside lags indicate 
the amount of time it takes for the government to recognize that fiscal policy needs to be 
changed (this is the so-called “recognition lag”) and then to introduce appropriate fiscal 
measures (this is the so-called “decision lag”). The conventional view is that fiscal policy is 
subject to long inside lags because it takes time to design, approve, and implement fiscal 
measures. Importantly, the bigger is the discretionary, structural component of the fiscal policy 
change, the longer are the inside lags. Certainly, the long inside lags of fiscal policy are a   15
potential problem for fiscal policy compared to monetary policy. However, the latter has also it 
own practical problems, especially regarding the outside lags (Arestis and Sawyer 2003 and 
2006). The converse of inside lags are outside lags, which indicate the amount of time it takes 
for policy change to affect the economy, namely the time the fiscal or monetary action takes to 
feed through the aggregate demand. The conventional view is that outside lags for fiscal policy 
are variable but short. By contrast, for monetary policy, outside lags are considered to be very 
long and unpredictable, usually 18–24 months. In short, the choice between fiscal and monetary 
policy in terms of practical or political arguments is not a clear one. 
In conclusion, in the last decade the NCM model has been subject to several criticisms. 
After a brief overview of these criticisms, the focus of this section has been on one of the most 
controversial assumptions of the NCM model, namely the absence of the government and an 
explicit role for fiscal policy in its core three-equation model. The conventional defense for this 
controversial assumption has been discussed: historical, theoretical, or practical reasons are 
nevertheless inadequate to support this controversial assumption. Given the size of the 
government and the increasing role of fiscal policy in modern economies, the next section 
explores a more explicit role for this policy in the NCM model.  
 
5. FISCAL POLICY IN THE NEW CONSENSUS MACROECONOMICS MODEL 
 
In a recent paper published by the National Bureau of Economics (NBER), aptly titled “The 
State of Macro,” Blanchard (2008) maintains that modern macroeconomics is experiencing a 
period of great excitement: theoretical and empirical advances are going hand-in-hand with 
convergence in both vision and methodology. Yet, he does acknowledge that the current state of 
macroeconomics is unsatisfactory regarding the role of government and fiscal policy: “A good 
normative theory of fiscal policy in the presence of nominal rigidities remains largely to be 
done” (Blanchard 2008).  
In fact, the academic literature on the effects of fiscal policy is scarce and divisive 
(Fontana 2009e). Whereas policymakers around the world are strongly supporting an increase in 
government expenditure in order to solve the deep financial crisis and economic recession of 
2007–09, academics are not sure about the direction of the effects of fiscal interventions, let 
alone the magnitude of those effects. For instance, Giavazzi and Pagano (1990) have studied the 
effects of large fiscal contractions in Denmark and Ireland in the 1980s concluding that the large   16
consolidations had strong expansionary effects on consumption and output. If taken to their face 
value, this analysis suggests that Portugal, Italy, Greece, Spain, just to mention few EU 
countries with high public deficit, should actually reduce rather than increase their state 
interventions in the economy in the face of the current financial crisis and deep recession. 
Interestingly, according to Kuttner and Posen (2001), the idea of expansionary fiscal 
contractions was invoked by policymakers in Japan in late 1996 to legislate a large increase in a 
value-added tax on national consumption. But, as they note, when by late 1997 Japan 
experienced a recession and a series of financial failures, the idea of expansionary fiscal 
contractions lost most of its appeal. 
Academics and policymakers have now achieved a large agreement about the role of 
monetary policy and its effects on the economy. The NCM model has crystallized this 
agreement through the three-equation model described above, but there is nothing like 
approaching a convergence of views about fiscal policy. There are at least two theoretical 
models to study the effects of fiscal policy, namely the neoclassical model and the New 
Keynesian model. Furthermore, there are at least two alternative approaches or methodologies 
for calculating the empirical estimates of the consequences of fiscal policy changes, namely the 
“narrative record,” or “dummy variable” approach, and the “structural vector auto regression 
(SVAR)” approach. Finally, the theoretical and empirical uncertainties about the direction and 
magnitude of fiscal interventions are compounded by the different forms of fiscal instruments. 
There is, in fact, a net contrast between the diversity of fiscal interventions and the uniformity of 
monetary policy interventions, which now take the universal form of changes in the short-run 
interest rate. In the face of such diverse and often divisive literature on the effects of fiscal 
policy, it is therefore not surprising that in the NCM model there is no explicit role for the 
government and fiscal policy.  
However, there is nothing intrinsically monetary in the nature of stabilization policy in 
the New Consensus model (Fontana 2009b). In other words, theoretically there is little or no 
reason to justify the current marginal role of fiscal policy in modern macroeconomics. If 
anything, looking at the set of equations 1–3 above, fiscal policy should actually have the most 
prominent role in the NCM model; the reason being that the role of the policy instrument in the 
NCM model can be played by any variable affecting components of the aggregate demand 
function and, prima facie, fiscal policy seems to be more direct in its effects compared to 
monetary policy.   17
Figure 1 has shown that interest rate policy strategies have a role in the aggregate 
demand channel as long as prices and wages are sticky. This is the essence of the so-called 
Taylor principle, namely the proposition that the central bank can stabilize the economy by 
raising the nominal short-run interest rate instrument more than one-for-one in response to 
higher inflation (Davig and Leeper 2005). The Taylor principle implicitly assumes that either 
prices or wages are fixed in the short run, or whatever little change there is in their values, this is 
known to the central bank, which can then use this information in order to attain (via changes in 
the controlled nominal interest rate) the desired level of the real short-run interest rate. This 
means that when changing it , the central bank takes into account these rigidities and, hence, is 
able to actually influence the short-run real interest rate, namely  () ( ) 1 + − t t t E i π . This is the 
initial, but essential, stage of the demand channel of the transmission mechanism of monetary 
policy. At the same time, the NCM model also assumes that in the long run, price and wage 
rigidities disappear. This is indeed the definition of long run in the model. What this means is 
that, except for the short-run when price and wage rigidities exist, the central bank is unable to 
influence the real interest rate. Putting it boldly, in the long run there is no aggregate demand 
channel for the transmission mechanism of monetary policy. This long-run neutrality of 
monetary policy raises an interesting conundrum for modern central banks.  
 
“Given the central bank claim that, in the medium and longer run, 
their influence is solely on nominal variables, e.g. inflation, and 
not at all on real variables, such as output and unemployment, it 
is somewhat difficult and sensitive to explain that, at much higher 
frequencies, up to two or so years out, their influence on inflation 
is via the transmission mechanism of bringing about changes to 
exactly such real variables, i.e. output and unemployment. 
Moreover, given the long lags involved before inflation responds 
to monetary policy, […] an attempt to drive a deviation of 
inflation from target rapidly back to that target could only be done 
by enforcing an (undesirably) large change in output, especially if 
that deviation emanated from an initial supply shock.” (Goodhart 
2007) 
 
Furthermore, the Calvo pricing mechanism, which provides the theoretical justification for the 
short-run price and wage rigidities, does not have much empirical support. 
The reliance of the transmission mechanism of monetary policy on short-run price and 
wage rigidities severely limits the role of the central bank in the NCM model. However, these   18
limitations do not necessarily apply to the government; there are no implicit or explicit 
assumptions on the values that prices and wages take either in the short-run or long run. 
Furthermore, it is not necessary to make unrealistic assumptions about the level of knowledge 
required by the government in order to achieve its policy target. The government can directly 
affect aggregate demand, and hence the output gap, by moving real government expenditure (G) 
and/or taxes (T). Figure 3 below presents the new aggregate demand channel. 
 
Figure 3. The Aggregate Demand (AD) Channel of the Transmission Mechanism of Fiscal 
Policy in the NCM  
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The government has complete control on the fiscal variables G and T, which can be 
manipulated for its own purposes. Figure 3 shows that changes in G and T will influence the 
parameter a0 in equation (1) of the NCM model presented above. Changes in a0 will then 
produce direct and indirect (via private consumption and investment) effects on the aggregate 
demand AD function. In turn, changes in the AD function affect the current level of current 
output y in the output gap() y y −  and via equation (2), the current inflation rate. Therefore, by 
appropriate changes in the level of government expenditure and taxes, the government is able to 
bring, and then maintain, the current inflation rate to its desired target level 
T π . Comparing the 
transmission mechanism of fiscal policy with the transmission mechanism of monetary policy, it 
is clear that in the former case the government has a direct control of the lever affecting the AD 
function and, hence, the output gap, namely a0, whereas in the latter case the central bank has 
only an indirect control on the real interest rate and, hence, no more than an imperfect and 
temporary influence on the AD function and output gap. 
In conclusion, the government and fiscal policy have only an implicit, if not marginal, 
role in the NCM model. However, it is not clear why this needs to be the case. Even with all of 
its limitations and problems, the NCM model can encompass a transmission mechanism of 
fiscal policy, which is at least as powerful as the transmission mechanism of monetary policy.  
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6. CONCLUSIONS 
 
This paper considered the recent evolution of formal models in macroeconomics from late 
1960s through the modern NCM model. Early macro models had two main features. They were 
the joint work of academics and policymakers and they aimed to provide a comprehensive and 
in-depth representation of the structure of the economy. The 1970s and 1980s were difficult 
decades for large structural models. The theoretical framework on which they were grounded, 
namely the neoclassical synthesis, was considered outdated. Furthermore, the comprehensive 
structure of the models proved, at times, to be too difficult to use for policy purposes. By the 
early 1990s, large structural models were out of fashion in academia and were slowly but 
increasingly discarded by policymakers around the world. Small models with few equations 
were developed. These post-Lucas critique models were “rigorous,” in the sense that the 
behavior of all agents in the model was built on microeconomic foundations, was optimal, and 
based on rational expectations. The price for these new features was the use of simplistic, and 
often unrealistic, assumptions. 
The current NCM model is the latest and most successful version of these post-Lucas 
critique models. It is a three-equation model made of an IS-type curve, a Phillips curve, and a 
monetary policy equation. It lays the foundations for the ubiquitous inflation-targeting policy 
strategies of modern central banks. In the face of the dramatic economic events of recent months 
and the inability of academics and policymakers to prevent them, the NCM model has been 
subject of several criticisms. This paper has considered one of its main criticisms, namely the 
absence of any essential role for the government and fiscal policy in the NCM model. Given the 
size of the public sector and the increasing role of fiscal policy in modern economies, this 
simplifying assumption of the NCM model is difficult to defend. This paper has maintained that 
conventional arguments supporting this controversial assumption, including historical reasons, 
theoretical propositions, or practical issues, do not have solid foundations. There is, in fact, 
nothing inherently monetary in the nature of stabilization policies in the model. Fiscal policy 
could play a role at least as important as monetary policy in the NCM model.  
Let us go back to the original questions at the beginning of this paper: would the NCM 
wither away under the continuous challenges posed by the financial crisis and the economic 
recession worldwide or would it amend itself to contain these challenges? These are difficult 
questions to answer. What is not difficult to imagine is that whatever formal macroeconomic   20
model is going to prevail in the near future, it cannot ignore the role of the public sector and the 
increasing role of fiscal policy in modern economies.   21
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